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Appreciating Appreciation 
In 2007 I thought I could argue directly for recuperating the concept of 
“appreciation” as a model of responsiveness to the particularity of art works.i
I acknowledged the efforts of Walter Pater to adapt this concept, but 
complained that his effort had been insufficiently philosophical.ii   Because he
was satisfied with exemplifying the concept rather than analyzing its 
elements, the concept of appreciation was soon relegated to providing a 
name for two critical practices.  On one hand appreciation was narrowed to 
the domain of connoisseurship, where the primary focus for responses to 
works of art were capacities for extremely detailed attention that mattered 
primarily for matters of attribution and description.  Appreciation seemed at 
the opposite pole from celebrating the power of the overall work or the 
challenge that it posed for inherited ways of thinking.  On the other hand the 
concept became an excuse for inattentive generalization as students were 
forced to sit through courses that offered “art appreciation,” or “the 
appreciation of literary masterpieces,” or, more recently, “the appreciation 
of cultural differences.”  “Appreciation” in the title became a euphemism for 
“art history light,” or “close reading without historical context,” or “pieties 
about cultural difference without the economics necessary to define the 
plight of oppressed groups.”
Now I can criticize the Altieri of 2007 for being insufficiently 
philosophical and insufficiently ambitious.  And now I have an even thicker 
ironic skin that enables me to ignore my own fears that today the concept of 
appreciation occupies the junk heap of failed metaphors for what can 
structure literary education.  More important, I feel I can build on Derek 
Attridge’s powerful critique of what he calls “instrumental” readings of 
literature which override their particularity in the service of bids to apply 
them to general social and philosophical themes.iii  He makes a compelling 
case that teachers of 
literature now have such anxieties about the relevance to their discipline 
that they are eager to ally literature with disciplines that promise practical 
consequences—whether it be affiliations with victims, the analysis of 
economic interests, projections about neurology, or the possibility of moral 
knowledge.  But he also shows how such pursuits risk destroying what 
disciplinary integrity the teaching of literature might have because without 
an emphasis on the particularity imaginations can compose we have no way 
to argue that we possess a distinctive way of developing more subtle and 
supple readers of an increasingly intricate social world.  
t
Yet I cannot share Attridge’s positive alternative to instrumentalization.
He casts significant literary texts as distinctive events whose singularity 
offers both a kind of truth and a kind of ethical demand that we honor its 
otherness.  I doubt that singularity can bear truth value, and I cannot 
understand how otherness can issue any kind of demand because demand 
requires common ground. iv  So I want to try another strategy for dealing with
literary texts that places the uniqueness of the made object within a broader 
context of related language games.  I will argue that practices of 
appreciation can bring the particularity of literary experience into continuity 
with some other basic ways of negotiating the world.
My full case will require a book.  That is good news for me but bad 
news for the reader now because I feel I have to offer the general thrust of 
my overall theoretical position as a backdrop for what I will say about 
appreciation.  Obviously I will have to be so brief as to risk offering only a 
parody of an argument (which would not be the first time this happened in 
literary studies).  Then I can settle down into a more careful explication of 
why I think appreciation is so valuable a concept.
I begin with the impossible but necessary task of challenging the 
authority of the concept of the humanities.  The concept is both arrogant and
empty.  It is arrogant because it assumes that whatever is not encompassed 
in its ken is somehow other than human.  And it is empty because, unlike the
sciences, the term does not refer to specific practices that have means of 
verification and of determining applications for the work they sponsor.  The 
term “humanities” has no practical correlate: it is as if the term just gives all 
practical use to its other, the sciences, and so can only make vague claims 
about developing sensibility and bringing ethical consciousness to bear on 
how we deal with an otherwise practical world.
This lack of connection between the concept of humanities and any 
particular concrete practices has important consequences.  The term 
produces a difference that masks a total lack of capacity to mobilize that 
difference in significant ways.  Because the humanities has become virtually 
a figure for the general lack of effective constraints on discursive practices, 
its sub-fields each after go whoring after disciplinary models that will not 
overtly repudiate them.  In particular, the study of literature seems now torn 
those literary critics who seek instrumental models aligning the study of 
texts with other better defined disciplinary frameworks and those critics like 
Attridge who turn primarily to aesthetics.  Each promises to allow the 
working out of cognitive claims for literary work—either by the work’s fitting 
into questions from other disciplines or by allowing the domain of cognitive 
t
to include a special kind of “truth”:  I am not sure how aware Atrridge is of 
the sad affinity between his claim for the truth of the literary event and New 
Critical claims for the non-discursive truth of fundamentally metaphoric 
statements.v
[[As we proceed I will have a lot to say about the limitations of 
instrumental approaches.  But our uses of aesthetics seem to me to offer 
more subtle problems that I have to engage immediately so that I can clarify 
the roles appreciation can play in literary experience.  Traditionally the 
aesthetic was the arena in which theorists explained the possibilities of 
judgments that were not oriented to practical consequences but were based 
on characterizing responses to objects that seemed significant for the 
experiences they caused rather than for the use values that they promised.  
Kant for example spoke of “reflective judgment” contrasted to determinate 
judgment, and the British empiricists made aesthetic inquiry the study of 
taste and the implications of modes of behavior not based on possessive 
individualism.vi  This tradition comes down to us largely in the concept of 
aesthetic attitudes by which we distinguish experiences oriented to our 
imaginative life from experiences with direct stakes in the practical world.
          But two basic pressures altered how aesthetic inquiry affected literary 
study. The first was internal.  If philosophers and artists of all kinds were 
going to idealize states of response that subordinated practical interests to 
more reflexive ones, they had to demonstrate what it was in the object that 
warranted such differences in response.  The second pressure was more 
vague and general, but no less powerful.  As the “humanities” increasingly 
came in conflict with science, proponents felt the need to develop concepts 
like “non-discursive truth” which required them to focus on how particular art
objects could provide values capable of competing with the sciences.  And 
without any disciplinary center, the various arts had to turn to aesthetics to 
provide accounts that gave the particular art object the relevant power.  
         The history of Kant’s aesthetic theory provides a useful illustration of 
these shifts.  Kant recognized from the start that he needed both a principle 
of judgment and an image of the object that could contrast aesthetic 
experience to the domains of understanding and of rational morality.  Hence 
his notions of “reflective judgment” and the purposiveness without purpose 
created by the genius having nature give the rule to art.  But while he 
elaborated the nature of the art object, Kant’s main focus was on the 
conditions of response by which the audience’s dispositions toward the world
might be modified by experiencing such objects.  Concentrating on response 
allowed him so elaborate a difference between mere liking and approving the
work, a distinction that requires the subject to experience capacities for 
t
universals contained within the act of judgment.  And then he could show 
how aesthetic experience became symbolic of moral experience because it 
approached the universals that in moral judgments were determined by 
practical reason.  
          But by the late nineteenth century theorists and artists abandoned 
Kant’s psychology of judgment.  All the emphasis had to be placed on the 
power of the purposive object to provide distinctive pleasures and open 
paths for the mind not limited by the constraints of empirical understanding. 
So where the emphasis on judgment had been, now there was only reliance 
on formalist accounts of the art object as possible explanations of how art 
might provide alternatives to practices devoted to economic rationality.  In 
effect the greater the pressure to specify alternatives the culture of 
commodities, the greater the need for concrete models on which the claims 
to difference might be based.
This is when the domain of aesthetics became problematic for literary 
studies, and this is why I will propose an alternative to talk about the 
humanities.  When the focus of aesthetics shifts from conditions of response 
to properties of the object, there is an obvious tendency to emphasize those 
properties of the object that are physically present, since these can be 
demonstrated as features that have to be engaged in different ways than we
normally adapt for objects of ordinary consumption.  One can show how 
these visible features produce internal relations establishing formal effects.  
And one can show how the medium works to confer individual force for these
elements like relations between point, line, and plane or rhythms and 
harmonic or anti-harmonic effects.  
        Such emphasis on internal relations threatens to narrow the scope of 
most art objects since the imagination is focused on how the object might be
distinct in itself rather than on how it might earn distinction because of how 
it engages concerns basic to social life in general.  This danger is magnified 
when we try to talk about all of literature within a model that at best fits 
some lyric poetry and experimental fiction.  One simply cannot say very 
much about most literary works if one talks about the medium in terms of 
letters or sounds or even internal formal relations.  Rather most texts we 
take as literary are primarily rhetorical objects: their elemental stuff directly 
engages us in worlds of meaning and the structuring of sense. vii   Meanings 
and structures have their material aspects, but we do not capture most 
writers’ intentions if we focus only on these.  And we do not see the 
possibility of different ways of applying what we usually treat as aesthetic 
attitudes if we let our objects of attention get defined primarily in aesthetic 
terms.  Only by stressing rhetorical purpose can we imagine how textual 
t
objects may be deployed for various expressive actions that can be defined 
dramatically rather than by analogies with other art media.  We might even 
do the other arts a favor by releasing them into dramatic means of 
foregrounding the place the work desires within our broader interests in 
understanding the world and its possibilities. ]]
        How do we work toward such release—both from the governing concept
of the humanities and from the focus on aesthetic objects that substitutes for
the lack of any determinate content in the idea of the humanities?  And how 
do we preserve respect for the distinctiveness of art objects if we emphasize 
their relation to other non-art practices?  In order to answer my own 
rhetorical questions I have to offer another set of generalizations. 
          I propose replacing the divide between the humanities and the 
sciences by returning to tripartite divisions of fields that were popular before 
science demanded increased authority over cultural life.  The tripartite also 
us to be more concrete because we can align each basic version of 
intellectual life with clear practices.  Where science was I would put the 
domain of description.  Descriptions aim at truth values because they are 
measured by their power to refer to observable entities and to place them in 
explanatory frameworks.  Second, there is the domain of policy that invokes 
something like Aristotle’s practical reason or Kant’s prudence.   Policy relies 
on descriptions, but the aim is not developing a stable relationship between 
phenomena and the laws that govern them.  Rather the basic aim of policy 
discourse is to provide and to test effective rationales for the actions they 
propose.  Policy is the art of making judgments about the welfare of various 
social units.
         Finally there is the large domain of expressive activity.  It too deals 
with particular rationales and shares a basic concern with the interpretation 
of actions.  But these interpretations are likely to stress what is typical, and 
so shareable and so negotiable in these actions.  Or we might make the 
same point by emphasizing how policy studies is more likely to situate the 
actions in patterns of needs or capacities or entitlements than to concentrate
on their particularity.  Expressive activity on the other hand invites a primary
concern for eliciting responsiveness to the particular force that the individual
act might embody.  And that cannot be done effectively  by description or by
practical reason.  Expressive activity invites attention to human subjectivity 
in its modes of display. Display consists in actions that strive to be 
recognized in their particularity rather than in their argumentative capacity 
to solicit a place in what seems backed by laws and regularities.   
Recognition of expressive particularity requires audiences willing and 
t
capable of fleshing out the possible significance of these actions and 
developing appropriate responses.  
        At this point we arrive at the importance of appreciation—not just in art 
but in the entire domain of expressive activities.  Appreciation becomes the 
primary positive means for honoring expressive power and for attuning 
responses adequate for this power.  Consider how Wittgenstein separates 
the expressive domain from the domain of descriptions.  He offers a simple 
contrast indicating the immense difference between “Red.” and “Red!” (PI p. 
187).  Under standard discursive conditions “Red.” binds us to examining 
how this could be a meaningful assertion: something addressed is or is not 
red, and so this statement is either true of false.  But if we replace the period
by an exclamation mark we drastically change the semantic environment.  
Now we are not dealing with a statement intended to be held up against the 
world and judged for its pictorial adequacy.  Rather we are invited to imagine
how we might flesh out this statement to explore its significance—for the 
agent whose expression it is and for the observer’s possible taking direction 
from the expression to see how he or she might find cause for exclamation if 
he or she can occupy imaginatively the position of the exclaimer.  We might 
ask the agent why he or she thinks the object of attention worthy of 
exclamation.  That could involve the agent confessing certain aspects of his 
or her character or basic concerns or ways of projecting the present into the 
future.  Or we could imagine possible answers to these questions that open 
up possible our own possible affective relations to the scene—directed both 
to the observer and to the red that the speaker cares about.
My book will elaborate how Wittgenstein constructs the domain of 
expression out of what his commentators call avowals.  Imagine the 
difference between what is called for as response to the statements “he is in 
pain” and “I am in pain.”   The first is a description—it is true or false and 
invites further questions like “where specifically does it hurt.”  The second is 
an expression.  We might ask where does it hurt.  But that will not satisfy a 
typical speaker of the sentence.  The speaker elicits responses that are 
concerned with the pain and that inquire what the auditor might do in 
support or in sympathy.  The expression invites attunement more than 
assessment of truth values.  
I consider much of what has been called the humanities a concern for 
this expressive dimension in experience.  At the most general level there are
three basic features of expressive behavior that are incorporated within the 
humanities.  First there is the expressive dimension of various kinds of public
and private acts where we aim to acknowledge and value the human 
t
concerns made visible rather than describe what is happening so that we can
find explanations for it.  Analogously there is often a significant expressive 
dimension in philosophy.  Plato or Hegel foreground the qualities of concern 
and feeling that go into their specific narratives.  Hegel even emphasizes the
goal of his philosophy as less discovering truth per se than bringing peace to 
the restless mind.  And there are obvious ways that historians can be 
concerned more with what actions and conditions express than with accurate
description of various social forces.
The case of the historian brings out a second feature of the concept of 
expression not stressed by Wittgenstein but marvelously elaborated by 
Hegel.  Expressive activity is always poised over a double genitive: the 
expression of a state can belong to the subject as a deliberate attribute or it 
can define the force of an object over the subject.  John’s expression of anger
can manifest intricate control or it can betray him even as he loudly claims I 
am not angry.  On a broader scale, an action like a war can be primarily an 
expression of the nation’s patriotic spirit or the fact that is duped by various 
economic interests or political chicanery.  There is usually ample room for 
critiques of expressive activity that demonstrate what kind of forces they are
expressions of that factor into the agent’s manner of acting.  
One can even appreciate the ways economic interests work on self-
deception or how intricate are our powers of misrecognition.  But when I use 
appreciation I will refer to a third domain of expression in which we not only 
attune ourselves to human activities but try to identify provisionally with 
them so that we can imagine what it would be like to be involved in the 
forces and pressures that the work embodies.  I think for example of Richard 
Wollheim’s  great notion that works of visual art matter for us to the degree 
that we can see into them to flesh out how they provide gestures of care on 
several levels—in terms of the images themselves and in terms of the 
implicit acts by the artist in rendering those images with certain qualities 
that engage our sympathies and interpretive energies.viii   
          In these cases identification need not be with the expressive author’s 
inner life.  To expand the field of possible identifications we need borrow one
last figure from Wittgenstein.  He distinguishes two modes of expression—an
agent’s activity of avowal and the agent’s building a model by which an 
audience can come to recognize what an expression can involve.  
Wittgenstein adds the notion of making a model for expressions because 
something very close to avowal can occur simply in our need to make clear 
the angle from which we see details and project possible affective 
consequences: 
t
    If I know that the schematic cube has various aspects and I want to 
find out
what someone else sees, I can get him to make a model of what he 
sees in
addition to a copy, or to point to such a model; even though he has no 
idea of
my purpose in demanding two accounts.
    But when we have a changing aspect the case is altered.  Now the 
only 
possible expression of our experience is what before perhaps seemed, 
or even 
was a useless specification when once we had the copy.  (PI, p. 196.
Think of how we might make sense of the expression “Red!”  by asking the 
agent for a model of what she sees. This model would not copy the 
impression of red but map a possibility for taking up that impression into an 
individual life history.
Talk of avowals matters because they afford good examples of how 
expressions call upon participation and attunement more than they do 
cognition.   Given these calls, 
I propose the figure of the appreciator as providing a worthy counterpart to 
the figure of the knower—the one quasi-superhero seeking to flesh out the 
power of particulars to engage attention, the other to account for what 
general factors allow the particular what significance it has. The figure of the 
appreciator develops how we might respond to the sense of particularity 
achieved by a particular state of expression in a given context.  Or, to make 
the same point in another way, appreciation is the elaboration of how we 
learn to see into expressive behaviors rather than see through them.  
Appreciation posits the goal of elaborating an individual’s capacities to fuse 
active intelligence with lively affective intensities.  It stresses how attention 
to particulars elicits and even structures feelings; it attunes us to forces and 
constructive energies shaping complicated experiences; and it engages us in
the kinds of moral energies that shape intense sympathies and aversions, 
while also setting those particular intensities against the possibility of any 
kind of moral generalization.  And, even more important, appreciation invites
second order reflections on the person one can become as we participate in 
such sympathies and such judgments.  It dramatizes for us how much of our 
energies are repressed when we confine ourselves to practical judgments 
and when we ignore the challenge of having to align our wills with what we 
have come to know.
t
          I can best make clear what appreciation involves by spelling out 
what I see as its four basic features.  Obviously we have to specify what is 
involved in our sense of the particular object to which we respond.  And we 
have to develop what occurs in us in that activity of responding.  Then the 
final two features involve the implications of such action for discussing how 
develop more capacious grammars from acts of attunement and we extend 
the values involved in appreciation to the political realm.  
            We appreciate acts, objects, and states that we encounter within 
quotidian experience when we attune ourselves to what seem their 
distinctive purposive characteristics .  (Purposiveness matters because that 
is what typically makes acts distinctive.)  We appreciate objects when we see
within them sources of fascination that engage affective aspects of invention
and lead us to examine them carefully.  When we turn to models that artists 
build for expressive purposes, we have somewhat different approaches to 
appreciation.  For the fact that these objects are constructed brings several 
features to the fore.  
The primary difference is that now the primary concern is neither with 
the subject nor the literal object.  Appreciating texts requires foregrounding 
how they offer particular versions of experience in such a way that they elicit
interest and fascination in that particularity.  This particularity emerges in 
the arts on two interconnected levels.  Reading involves recognizing how the 
work offers a purposive and self-reflexive bid to be fleshed out imaginatively 
as a specific action. And it entails attending to those qualities that emerge in 
our response for a sense of our own powers for participating as well as for 
caring about that participation.  Through our attuning to the activity of the 
subject shaping the work we recognize its place within what we might call 
our grammar for engaging experience. 
That grammar is self-reflexive: think of simultaneously trying to 
identify with Othello’s passion and figuring out what powers one takes on by 
participating imaginatively in Othello’s passion.  We have to take in the 
degree to which the work is not only about expressive activity but takes on 
expressive force in itself as an embodiment of passion and of the effort to 
negotiate the implications of that passion.  And we have to recognize how 
the constructive activity makes use of the history of techne in the relevant 
medium by virtue of the artistic decisions that foregrounded. ix   It matters 
how Shakespeare combines traditional allegorical representations of figures 
like Iago with a much more modern plumbing of indecipherable depths that 
emerge when we question his motives.  
t
This manipulation of technique becomes a major factor in sharpening 
the sheer force of articulation by which the work bids to take on significance 
for its distinctive treatment of its materials.  And that sense of individuality 
often emerges because as the inner relations grow more intricate it becomes
impossible to relegate the work to any governing concept or type.  We have 
to refer to that intricacy rather than our ideas about the subject in order to 
define how the object takes on expressive force.  Often it feels that we do 
not appreciate the object on our terms but its terms: the art object can 
present a level of demand and challenge and mystery not typical in other 
domains of appreciation.   So Attridge is right to emphasize the event 
qualities of these interacting modes of relation intensifying the imaginative 
concreteness of the work.  But these very features force upon us, I think, not 
a language of truth and of morality but of power and demand and challenge 
and even fear that one is not quite adequate to what is being asked by that 
object. 
A full demonstration of how textual objects produce this sense of 
power and challenge to the imagination is beyond the ken of this paper.  And
it is probably unnecessary since anyone reading this is likely to have had the
relevant experience.  
But I do want to indicate how efficiently and how thoroughly an ideal of 
appreciation can help celebrate significant dimensions of our reading 
experience by aligning them with the grammar by which we respond to 
expressive activity in general.  So I will attend briefly to two short lyrics by 
Yeats—elaborating how language develops intensely concrete purposive 
relations that call upon and reward our resources for attunement.
The first poem, “A Drinking Song,” experiments with locating the 
expressiveness of poetry at a considerable distance from the speaking 
subject.  In fact it is primarily the song form that speaks by creating a virtual 
space within the syntax that the reader must enter in order to complete the 
poem’s suggestiveness: 
Wine comes in at the mouth
And love comes in at the eye;
That is all we shall know for truth
Before we grown old and die.
I lift the glass to my mouth,
I look at you, and I sigh. (CP 92)
I read the poem as inviting its readers to correlate three two-line syntactic 
units.  The first consists of the work of the mouth and the eye.  The second 
offers a somewhat pious and abstract version of the work of the mind 
attempting to articulate a generalized attitude toward what the body 
t
experiences.  The world of physical actions gets displaced into 
hypergeneralization.  Then we return to the body.  And syntax defines the 
powers in which we then participate.  There is a one to one correlation 
between the abstract claim about the mouth and the speaker’s responsive 
gesture.  The second correlation takes only half a line because all one need 
to say to flesh out “love comes in at the eye is “I look at you.”  To say 
anything more would be to risk the displacing power of mind that we have 
already seen in the second unit.  
Why is the physical correlate for the act of mind only “I sigh”?  Here I 
think the economy of the poem gets complicated, and thrilling.  In one sense 
the sigh continues the focus on looking at “you”: this sigh suggests the 
immense gulf between the moment of loving and living with that love.  But 
the major force of the sigh is generated by the contrast between it and the 
second two-line unit that it completes.  What other bodily parallel might 
there be to the banal wisdom offered by the reflective mind?  How can the 
poem internalize that action without submitting itself to another version of 
wisdom?.  If what the mind says is true, the body can only sigh and act out 
its desire.  Taken dramatically the sigh is a mark of pathos, a mode of 
surrender to fate slightly redeemed by the irony of knowing that more words 
would only create more pathos.  But understood in relation to the tripartite 
structure of the poem, sighing becomes brilliantly active.  This expressive act
counters the mind’s tendency toward sad generalization by making the sigh 
a willed form of expression: this lady is worth all the uncertainty that must 
follow letting oneself become a hostage to fortune.  And style visibly takes 
on the power to make the responder recalibrate his or her interpretive 
stance—toward the lovers and perhaps toward the power of song itself to 
invoke its own traditional powers.
          “The Magi” has a very different approach to expressive force, and to 
the syntactic features that model its contours:
Now as at all times I can see in the mind’s eye
In their stiff, painted clothes, the pale unsatisfied ones
Appear and disappear in the blue depth of the sky
With all their ancient faces like rain beaten stones,
And all their helms of silver hovering side by side,
And all their eyes still fixed, hoping to find once more,
Being by Calvary’s turbulence unsatisfied,
The uncontrollable mystery on the bestial floor. CP 124)
But again it is attention to the qualities of the act of mind that give the poem
its particular intensities as event.  The syntax here makes concrete a waiting
that cannot long put off the inevitable encounter with terror.  Because there 
t
is a personalized speaker, the Magi can be taken out of historical context 
into another, more perplexing psychological and mythic state.  Yet their 
force in this state depends on intricate links between sound and syntax.  The
first delay takes place because of a quiet clause that briefly interrupts the 
movement from subject to object in the opening sentence.  The disruption in 
syntax is countered by the continuity of the long a’s that make 
dissatisfaction pervade the opening.  Then there is the much greater series 
of delays that constitute the middle of the poem—as if the speaker were 
putting of the very confrontation that the figure of the magi made possible.  
Fascination shifts momentarily from what the mind’s eye has to see to what 
mediates that seeing.  
But these hesitations ultimately intensify the sense of horror in two 
basic ways.  “Being by Calvary’s turbulence unsatisfied” presents an 
absolute clause that complicates the sense of delay.  The previous three 
lines had observed the Magi from the outside; now the poem presents the 
basis of their values from the inside.  And then we see clearly why the 
speaker makes the identification in the first place. No delay can put off for 
long this profound dissatisfaction with Cavalry.  But these delays do 
considerably sharpen the force of “uncontrollable”—both in its semantic 
register as the opposite of an ultimately redemptive scene and in its sonic 
register setting up the liquid register of “bestial floor.”  Ultimately this poem 
preserves as long as it can details that stress the humanity in both the 
speaker’s and the magi in order to intensify what is involved in the demand 
now to confront its absolute other.  Syntax and sound manage to temper 
that otherness even as they threaten to assert their own independence as 
aspects of what is no longer controllable by humanity.
Both poems make distinctive contributions to our grammar for dealing 
with emotions—“Drinking Song” by invoking the logic of song and by 
complicating attitudes toward the pathos of desire, and “The Magi” by 
staging ambivalence about our desires to break through cultural frameworks 
to see vividly what they try to sublimate.  So if we can free the reader from 
the obligation to treat the text as an example within some analysis of social 
forces or philosophical inquiry, we can begin to elaborate readerly rewards 
that extend beyond the sheer pleasure of admiring how the particular 
unfolds. 
I propose to perform that act of liberation by invoking for literary study 
Richard Wollheim’s ideal of learning to see into paintings.  “Seeing in” 
provides us the seeds for a practice of reading that relies on the language I 
have been employing of attunement, empathy and identification.  Subjects 
t
cultivate the values latent in these particulars by taking up imaginative 
stances characterized by what I call slow reflective judgment.  Rather than 
attempt to dispose the particular by placing it within some specific 
categories allowing us to make use of it, we let our attention hover over what
makes the object or text significant because of what happens as we attend 
to it.  
          Appreciation may involve a good deal of interpretive activity.  But it 
pursues cognitive elements primarily because they serve two kinds of 
affective interests--in first order qualities of responsiveness and in second-
order investments in who the person becomes by virtue of such 
responsiveness.  Careful attention leads to questioning the object, and 
questioning leads to possible means of beginning to articulate its possible 
significance for us as an activity, or relation to our activity.  Moreover such 
attention brings the will into play.  Ultimately our aim is not only to 
understand how the particular offers a significant action but to affirm our 
pleasure because it stimulates our energies and promises connections with 
our structures of concern.  We engage the object of attention in order to 
exercise our capacities to care about what we encounter, even if the 
satisfaction involves identifying with a power to unsettle and create 
discomfort.
This may be just to say that appreciation is intimately connected with 
taking on aesthetic attitudes.  But we have to be clear that such attitudes 
need not be disinterested. x   Rather the attitudes afford specific 
opportunities to satisfy our imaginative interests in fleshing out the 
existential implications of what we read into the text.  Such constructs train 
us in adapting the resources of consciousness and self-consciousness to 
versions of expressive states.  Therefore they prove continuous with the full 
range of actions that can be valued in terms of what they express--from the 
sublime skills of athletic performance to what artists do to how we clumsily 
try to acknowledge acts of generosity, to refined versions of cruelty.  The 
only qualification is that the focus on the practice abstracts from its practical 
goals to reflect on the qualities by which values and interests are pursued.  
Hegel can be seen as a great philosopher because of the depth of his 
analyses and the suggestiveness of his language.  Even cultural criticism can
be seen for its imaginative virtues, on those rare occasions when they prove 
striking.
If we concentrate on literary experience I can propose as our basic 
educational ideal conferring on students the capacity to clarify how texts 
make particular states of being available to audiences in ways that can 
engage the reader’s full range of reflective and sympathetic energies.  We 
t
can contrast this model of participation to instrumental interpretations 
because with such modes of interpretation the relevant disciplinary practices
offer no systematic help in learning to read for imaginative flexibility or 
openness to complexity or the refining of our capacities to register how style 
becomes capable of extending our affective investments in the work’s 
relation to the world.  Instrumental readings stressing seeing through texts 
risk missing everything that is involved in the difference between “Red.” and
“Red!” or in the contrast between generalization and “I sigh.”  That would 
involve a substantial cognitive loss, since we would not understand the 
impact of expressive acts on our capacities for response to human actions.  
And it would involve a substantial loss for our affective lives in relation to 
how we manage to care about both our own qualities of responsiveness and 
the kinds of states on which these are focused.  
         If we attend to texts only as instrumental means of producing 
knowledge we simply lose modes of valuing that emphasize how texts can 
satisfy interests distinctive to the experience of one’s powers as a subject.  
This is why I want to place literary texts in a domain where it can be seen as 
an extension of practices that are fundamental and significant for our 
interests in the qualities of our lives.  Literary works have the distinctive trait
of inviting attention to two modes or levels of expression that our responses 
try to bring into conjunction—the modeling of a world we see through our 
participation in how the text stages expressive activity, and the shape of the 
modeling  activity itself as a process of authorial decision-making that tries 
to afford an objective shape to how the expression can make a difference in 
its world.
It is probably past the time that I have to make clear how appreciation 
manages to mediate between attention to the particular and contextualizing 
those particulars in relation to our sense of how we best form minds and 
affective dispositions capable of enriching social interactions and formulating
general attitudes toward values.  As my third general category I want to 
speculate on how we adapt our sense of particulars to more capacious 
cultural frameworks and modes of interpreting experience.  Put simply, 
habits of appreciation foster conditions where we make supple transitions 
from seeing into particulars to adapting those particulars as means of seeing
as and therefore as elements within more capacious cultural orientations.  
Seeing in produces possible dense examples that we can use for sorting our 
experiences in the present and in the future.xi  With art the relevant sense of 
example is not as an instance of a generalization.  The work is not an 
t
example of anything.  Rather it becomes as an example as a particular 
demonstration of concerns and energies that gathers possible implications 
and applications and gives them an imaginative home—whether we find the 
text dramatizing possible applications or offering contrasts that sharpen 
other modes of engaging the world.  
For example, the more richly we see into the character of Claudius, the
more likely we are to compose a vision of sucking all the air out of what life 
might be for a stepson, and the more likely we are to be sympathetic with 
those who identify with that son’s condition.  Analogously, we can treat “the 
Magi” as affording examples that function  on several levels, from the 
psychology by which we negotiate our own fascination with terror to social 
formations that refuse to be content with Enlightenment rationality.   In both 
cases the examples function both by providing analogues for our own 
experiences and by providing figures of difference by which we specify what 
matters for us  in those experiences.  
Here I am less interested in the specific dynamics of how we use 
examples than in the purchase that model gives on how those concerned 
with expressive phenomena can pursue forms of social agreement about 
expressions that parallels the kind of agreement produced by epistemic 
disciplines.  My claims have been based on the difference between 
description and expression, so I cannot make cognitive claims that one 
comes to “know’ what expressions involve in ways that compel social 
agreement.  So we have to talk about critical uses of exemplification making 
available what can be recognized as shareable powers to value those 
particulars.  We can produce agreement on the process by which we 
elaborate why texts matter even if we continue to differ on what they are 
doing.
Clearly I need Kant’s distinction between liking and approving to 
characterize the sociality of discussion about art.  The effort to reach beyond 
immediate subjective pleasure towards the possibility that we can all see 
how the work might become exemplary depends on preserving interpersonal
modes by which we sometimes exercise subjective judgments.  But just as 
clearly one can no longer share Kantian talk of universals, even if only 
achieved symbolically.  I have to rely on the possibility that we have 
tendencies to want to share acts of appreciation because we recognize that 
the appreciation can be deeper when it engages the ways other people see 
the object.  Max Scheler pointed out that there are two fundamental models 
of value.  One model takes the form of zero sum games where for one to 
gain something the other must lose.  If I want more cake someone must get 
t
less.  The other model offers just the opposite case: when I attend a 
symphony my sense of value is enhanced by the efforts of the audience to 
take as much pleasure for themselves as possible. (I offered this model to a 
class in the 1970’s where one scruffy student exclaimed, “When I am stoned 
that cake is a symphony.”)
Insofar as appreciation fits the second model we can see how acts of 
appreciation build up public languages about the capacities of expressive 
activity to sponsor shareable modes of responsiveness.  These need not 
involve agreement.  It suffices that they involve the desire to include other 
responses in one’s own considerations.  Or the appreciation can be adapted 
so that it places itself in dialogue with those of others.  We produce social 
groups in part identified by how they see the text connecting to the world, 
and affording imaginative possibilities within it.  And we have the basis for 
explaining why differences in interpretation can celebrated as signs of a 
text’s continuing relevance for a society.
Finally I want to develop the significance of the fact that many of our 
culture’s most highly valued literary texts make a major issue of 
exemplifying the cultural implications of the possibilities for appreciation that
the text affords.  Probably the most intimate examples of the connection 
occur in Shakespeare’s epilogues, where the actor asks the audience to 
speculate on how their applause for the play might have implications for 
their beliefs and behaviors.  And the entire last act of A Winter’s Tale 
consists in a movement from narrating the consequences of the daughter’s 
return to the simple wordless witnessing of the miracle that allows Leontes 
to return to married life.  The Odyssey offers exemplary moments where 
Odysseus’ marvels at what civilized life can offer, and the Divine Comedy 
concentrates ultimately on appreciating how God’s justice and God’s love 
can be one.  I do not intend to browbeat my readers into an ideology of 
appreciation: they would not appreciate that.  But I want to indicate the 
possibility that serious reflection on what is asked of audiences can get 
internalized thematically as the writer’s awareness of how imaginative 
activity can be woven into the work of civilization.
These texts suggest that appreciation has civilizing force, and hence 
for me political force because it tries to resist the destructive dynamics of 
resentment.xii  Therefore I will argue that the cultivating of these aesthetic 
dispositions is a significant form of social action, and probably the best 
literary experience can do in offering a politics compatible with focusing on 
the particularity of texts.  Appreciation will usually not have force sufficient 
to overrule the empirical ego’s practical judgments or to combat successfully
t
the way the academy has made this empirical ego virtually the absolute 
arbiter of values.  Nor will appreciation have sufficient force to weigh heavily 
in many judgments about the choices available to us as social agents.  
Nonetheless there are times when appreciation can provide awareness of 
more capacious possible grounds of judgment, if only in the vocabulary for 
human relations that they deploy.  And those opportunities may enter into an
ideal calculus for judging what we might do in particular circumstances.
The relevance of such observations for political life is not glamorous.  
These observations do not promise revolution or even modifications in social 
justice.  But reading attentively, and affirming the states that result, may 
produce social good beyond the pleasures such states afford, because 
readers find themselves potential participants in the struggle between 
appreciation and resentment.  Just think about how often people seem 
consumed by resentment about race, class, gender, and virtually any 
privilege given to one group and not to another.  It often seems as if 
resentment were our form of social glue, since there we find a strange 
source of equality and a common vocabulary.  But, as  Nietzsche showed, 
this social glue locks individuals into fierce efforts to defend imaginary 
versions of themselves.   Resentment at being denied what we think we are 
worth only generates oppositional structures between what we resist as 
oppression and we often glory in as justifiable domination.  When agents 
enter this condition, they narrow their sense of self-worth to self-defensive 
abstract identifications much too inflexible to match actual opportunities for 
exploring new aspects of our experiences.  
          Appreciation alone cannot provide concepts that might bring this 
needed flexibility.  More important, the proponent of appreciation has to 
recognize that resentment is sometimes necessary and productive because 
it martials forces against injustice—nowhere more pointedly than in relation 
to the privileges held by the one percent in American society.  But habits of 
reading for appreciation can help us recognize what is representative in 
dangerous modes of self-protection for which I find Leontes in A Winter’s 
Tale exemplary.  And these habits are not quietist.  They offer constant 
exercises in deploying the will as we try to adapt the attitudes that inform 
gratitude and respect.  These habits introduce us to worlds where we find 
interests in mobilizing the imagination’s capacities for sympathy or 
cooperation rather than having to negotiate conflicts over entitlements.  
          On another level, acts of appreciation dramatize self-reflexive paths 
where we are encouraged to dwell on what we honor rather than suspect or 
fear.  Attention to these paths implicates us in a quotidian politics with no 
imposing drama and little opportunity for righteousness (unless one writes 
t
literary theory).  But I suspect that any significant politics is a quotidian 
politics—either fighting for specific agendas or living out specific 
commitments to forms of self-regard that have a strong interest in the 
processes by which one can recognize other people’s humanity.  I fear that 
no less a change of disposition is required if we are to produce alternatives 
to all the incitements to resentment in how Western societies handle race, 
gender, and economic distinctions.  If we can keep our attention on what 
gives us the kinds of pleasures that an interest in sheer meaningfulness can 
afford, we might be able to make at least small turns to possible states of 
mind grounded in gratitude rather than resentment.  There will still be 
enough resentment left over to fuel large-scale political commitments and 
struggles over the vacuous heritage of talk about the humanities.
t
i   “Why Appreciation Ought to be Revived as a Model for the Study of the Arts.”  
Frame
     (2007): 63-80.
ii    Pater’s basic work in this vein is his collection of essays Appreciations
iii   Derek Attridge The Singularity of Literature      .   I feel much more attachment to Rita Felski’s   
, but she 
iv   First I think Attridge’s  terms like “singularity” and “other” confuse quantity and quality and are
practically unusable.  As ATtridge notices, but is not bothered by, singularity must become typical 
on some level and the other must gravitate toward the same.  How can we tell when and where to 
preserve otherness and when to seek sameness.  Attridge seems to think such decisions happens 
in reading, or, better, in performing the text.  I think such terms just add metaphysical elements 
that make it impossible to settle on existential states without worrying that we are failing some 
ideal condition of inventiveness.  Yet writers typically want to construct a model or attitude; they 
do not aim to construct a singularity or an other.  Similarly his model is based on creativity and the
obligations it imposes on an audience.  My model is based on how readers can place texts in the 
world and adapt languages directly significant in that world.  Finally, Atttridge on the other has to 
envision an epistemic state—responding to a text—producing obligations that involve affective 
states and active dispositions.  But there is nothing is the simple existence of the other as text 
that can obligate us to an ethical language driven by an other as personal presence.  Recognizing 
the singularity of a person could be a reason for fear or violence rather than letting it be.  
Appreciation on the other hand is from the start a condition of pleasure and a disposition of will.  I 
think pleasure involves interests, not obligations, and therefore one can make predications about 
reading that do not involve obligations driven by fictions of authors and analogues for authored 
things.
Also ATtridge’s idio-culture stresses the differences that make up an indivdual’s world.  Yet those 
differences for me are eclipsed by the language games that make that world articulate and allow 
exchanges within it.  and those are spaces held in common, so that fosters the ability to move 
around in them seems to be more valuable than the ability to locate one’s own differences and 
even enjoy them.
v   It seems clear that one comes away from reading significant literature with 
fresh and new senses of what might count as knowledge.  But it also seems clear 
that when we try to define that knowledge we end up subsuming possibilities into 
existential properties and flirting with versions of truth that in the next breath we 
need to call aesthetics to the rescue.  So will avoid cognitive claims—not because 
literature is not informative on many levels but because we simply do not have 
effective ways of correlating such claims with the domain of possibility that for me
seems basic to literary experience.  This may not be satisfying but it should help 
us avoid the more unsatisfying consequences of the bad faith I think inherent in 
our prevailing disciplinary models.
vi   John Guillory in chapter five of his Cultural Capital makes a strong case for the role of taste in 
Enlightenment social theory and the loss of that when aesthetics turns to the qualities of objects.
vii   I try versions of this argument for a new and altered emphasis on rhetoric in literary studies in 
two essays: NLH and Chicago Review
viii   Wollheim, Painting as an Art
ix   artists and writers can offer versions of expression without any reference to Romantic 
inwardness—think of Malevich earning the exclamation mark after “red” by how he positions a red
square in relation to a larger black one, or Van Gogh earning it by how his image of compressed 
bedroom plays its red against a sickly green.
x   Kant’s focus on pleasure rather than on other terms for engaging the object traps him into 
equating interest with the existence of the object rather than his only alternative, pleasure in the 
work.
And my proposal emphasizes the continuities of literary experience with other kinds of experience
—the opposite path from Attridge because he wants a poetics and ethics of the other, which 
becomes a metaphysical term even though he fights it. [It is also the opposite path from Adorno 
who illustrates the problem of trying to define art so as to preserve both autonomy and truth 
without separating spheres of activity (or language games) and the practices they involve.]  
xi   I have too many times drawn out the impact of this model of sorting by repeating Nelson 
Goodman’s arguments.  Now I will just allude to what I consider is my clearest statement—witt and
example essay
xii   See History of Resentment by Frero I think
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